{"id":3039,"date":"2026-09-01T02:09:20","date_gmt":"2026-09-01T02:09:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/arakanwatch.org\/?p=3039"},"modified":"2026-09-01T02:09:20","modified_gmt":"2026-09-01T02:09:20","slug":"managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/arakanwatch.org\/en\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/","title":{"rendered":"MANAGING THE MARGINS: CHINA&#8217;S RISK CALCULUS IN MYANMAR&#8217;S CIVIL WAR"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: left;\">This paper attempts an explanation using a risk-management assessment approach. It posits that China engages with EAOs in Myanmar based on risk management, which is actor-specific, time-bound and reversible since its primary goals are border stability and safeguarding its strategic and economic interests in Myanmar.<\/p>\n<header class=\"_column --boxed-content --narrow --margin-top-40 --margin-bottom-16\">\n<div class=\"--uppercase --semi-bold --body-extra-small --text-medium-grey --margin-bottom-8\">By Htet Shein Lynn<img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"--image-height-100 --image-width-100 --object-fit-cover wp-post-image\" src=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/AFP__20240531__34TU6GV__v1__HighRes__MyanmarConflictCoupRakhine-copy.jpeg\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 718px) 100vw, 718px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/AFP__20240531__34TU6GV__v1__HighRes__MyanmarConflictCoupRakhine-copy.jpeg 718w, https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/AFP__20240531__34TU6GV__v1__HighRes__MyanmarConflictCoupRakhine-copy-300x200.jpeg 300w\" alt=\"\" width=\"718\" height=\"479\" \/><\/div>\n<\/header>\n<p><main id=\"content\" class=\"post-17940 post type-post status-publish format-standard has-post-thumbnail hentry category-opinion tag-armed-ethnic-conflict-in-myanmar tag-china-power tag-eaos\"><\/p>\n<div class=\"_column --boxed-content --narrow\">\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><em>This photo taken on 21 May 2024 shows a destroyed house following fighting between Myanmar\u2019s military and the Arakan Army (AA) ethnic minority armed group in a village in Minbya Township in western Rakhine State. Photo by AFP.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">(<em>This Op-ed article was originally published on The\u00a0<\/em><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/www.iseas.edu.sg\/articles-commentaries\/iseas-perspective\/2026-49-managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war-by-htet-shein-lynn\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>ISEAS<\/em><\/a><em>\u00a0website on July 9, 2026.)<\/em><\/p>\n<p><strong>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list has-background\">\n<li>China engages Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) in Myanmar based on pragmatic risk management rather than ideological alliance or proxy sponsorship.<\/li>\n<li>Beijing adjusts its posture according to the EAOs\u2019 geographic proximity to China\u2019s strategic assets in Myanmar, their leverage potential over Naypyidaw, and their independent capacity to break out of China\u2019s circle of influence.<\/li>\n<li>Based on these calculations, China asserts three shifting management modes in engaging with different EAOs: 1) tolerant containment (United Wa State Army-UWSA); 2) tactical accommodation (Kachin Independence Army-KIA and Arakan Army-ULA\/AA); and 3) instrumental enablement followed by restraint (Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army aka Kokang Army-MNDAA and Ta\u2019ang National Liberation Army-TNLA).<\/li>\n<li>China thus treats EAOs in Myanmar mainly as instrumental tools to pressure Naypyidaw, rather than as strategic partners. This means China will not hesitate to switch its support among the various EAOs if Beijing views its long-term strategic interests in Myanmar to be at risk. The recent enforcement of ceasefires in northern Myanmar following some EAOs\u2019 expansion activities serves as a cautionary example.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"emoji\" role=\"img\" draggable=\"false\" src=\"https:\/\/s.w.org\/images\/core\/emoji\/17.0.2\/svg\/25aa.svg\" alt=\"\u25aa\ufe0f\" \/>INTRODUCTION<\/strong><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">During the launch of \u201cOperation 1027\u201d<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"08486185-fc3e-4f14-8ea4-5fe105ef79c2\"><a id=\"08486185-fc3e-4f14-8ea4-5fe105ef79c2-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#08486185-fc3e-4f14-8ea4-5fe105ef79c2\">1<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0on 27 October 2023, the coalition of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta\u2019ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA), known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance, faced little intervention from China. Consequently, the three EAOs swiftly seized numerous towns and military bases in Northern Shan State.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"1382fa6d-ca4f-4637-8af1-1592e9edb71b\"><a id=\"1382fa6d-ca4f-4637-8af1-1592e9edb71b-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#1382fa6d-ca4f-4637-8af1-1592e9edb71b\">2<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0However, the conflict landscape dramatically changed in late July 2024, after MNDAA seized Lashio, an economic hub in Northern Shan State near the China-Myanmar border, which also housed the Myanmar military\u2019s Northeastern Regional Command.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"5a320b82-abc0-4ed0-a72c-867887c36f78\"><a id=\"5a320b82-abc0-4ed0-a72c-867887c36f78-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#5a320b82-abc0-4ed0-a72c-867887c36f78\">3<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0China had not expressed any disagreement at the start of Operation 1027, but now it decided to step in to mediate (and pressure MNDAA to agree to) a ceasefire with the State Administration Council (SAC).<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"6d122d68-375b-453f-b906-48ea8ac5819a\"><a id=\"6d122d68-375b-453f-b906-48ea8ac5819a-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#6d122d68-375b-453f-b906-48ea8ac5819a\">4<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0MNDAA then halted its offensive, agreed to a bilateral ceasefire, and relinquished Lashio in April 2025.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"dc33ce61-a321-4e9c-ab7e-f33babba13cb\"><a id=\"dc33ce61-a321-4e9c-ab7e-f33babba13cb-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#dc33ce61-a321-4e9c-ab7e-f33babba13cb\">5<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0China also facilitated a ceasefire between SAC and TNLA, as well as TNLA\u2019s relinquishment of Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Mogok, and Momeik.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"36531a6f-e063-4617-961f-71a406a3cea6\"><a id=\"36531a6f-e063-4617-961f-71a406a3cea6-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#36531a6f-e063-4617-961f-71a406a3cea6\">6<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0A significant coordinated military operation against SAC, which initially seemed tolerated by China and which cost SAC a historic defeat, was also halted by China\u2019s assertive mediation.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"e1e4a982-3f92-4598-861f-8112e66c57f1\"><a id=\"e1e4a982-3f92-4598-861f-8112e66c57f1-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#e1e4a982-3f92-4598-861f-8112e66c57f1\">7<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">China has an unavoidable presence and interest in Myanmar\u2019s conflict. The long, shared border with Myanmar in northern Shan State and extensive investments under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) mean that China engages with both Naypyidaw and multiple EAOs to meet or protect its own interests. Yet its posture toward each of its interlocutors in Myanmar varies.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In any case, China\u2019s posture toward EAOs cannot be considered proxy sponsorship, as its support is conditional and reversible, as in the aftermath of Operation 1027. It is also not an ideological alliance since China has never shown any interest in sharing political goals or norms with EAOs.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This paper attempts an explanation using a risk-management assessment approach. It posits that China engages with EAOs in Myanmar based on risk management, which is actor-specific, time-bound and reversible since its primary goals are border stability and safeguarding its strategic and economic interests in Myanmar.<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"emoji\" role=\"img\" draggable=\"false\" src=\"https:\/\/s.w.org\/images\/core\/emoji\/17.0.2\/svg\/25aa.svg\" alt=\"\u25aa\ufe0f\" \/>China\u2019s risk-based peripheral management framework<\/strong><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">China\u2019s posture toward EAOs is neither that of alliance formation nor proxy sponsorship; instead, it reflects risk-based peripheral management. China assesses EAOs based on actor-level attributes that affect the stability and security of its interests in Myanmar, and then adopts one of three graduated management modes to preserve border stability, protect strategic assets, and avoid political precedents.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">China\u2019s policy may therefore be best understood as calibrated management, rather than outright support or opposition. Its assessments are based on three key independent variables.<\/p>\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Geographic Proximity to Chinese Strategic Assets<\/strong><br \/>This variable depends on whether or not an armed actor is able to exercise power and control, or on the extent to which China deems that this actor\u2019s operations are close to infrastructure and areas that are of strategic interest to China. Such areas include border trade zones, trade routes, pipeline and CMEC projects. For example, despite its silence at the launch of Operation 1027, China began deploying private security forces in Kyaukphyu township in Rakhine State, where China\u2019s deep seaport project is hosted, only after AA launched an offensive against SAC.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"ab05b8d7-531e-481f-a540-a58bd8cffd68\"><a id=\"ab05b8d7-531e-481f-a540-a58bd8cffd68-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#ab05b8d7-531e-481f-a540-a58bd8cffd68\">8<\/a><\/sup>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Leverage Potential on Naypyidaw<\/strong><br \/>An armed actor\u2019s leverage potential reflects their ability to exert pressure on Naypyidaw in ways that benefit China. For example, when SAC did not comply with China\u2019s request to eradicate online scam operations along the China-Myanmar border, this apparently led China not to oppose the launch of Operation 1027, despite that offensive\u2019s proximity to the China-Myanmar border.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"b575e466-3541-4c44-8672-9b2dd22051da\"><a id=\"b575e466-3541-4c44-8672-9b2dd22051da-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#b575e466-3541-4c44-8672-9b2dd22051da\">9<\/a><\/sup>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Independence Ability<\/strong><br \/>An armed actor may, at times, attempt to forge relations with external actors beyond China, form alliances with newly emerging armed groups, or expand military operations without external assistance (especially from China). For example, once MNDAA started relations with international media and expanded its operations beyond the Kokang region, China started exerting pressure on the EAO, despite not having opposed Operation 1027.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"0052f293-5735-4d5d-936d-eae2915ced14\"><a id=\"0052f293-5735-4d5d-936d-eae2915ced14-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#0052f293-5735-4d5d-936d-eae2915ced14\">10<\/a><\/sup><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00a0<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These variables are dynamic rather than static, based on an armed actor\u2019s risk profile, which can be changed according to that actor\u2019s choice of territorial expansion; battlefield dynamics; and alliance formation. Any of these can prompt forth adjustments to China\u2019s choice of management modes.<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"emoji\" role=\"img\" draggable=\"false\" src=\"https:\/\/s.w.org\/images\/core\/emoji\/17.0.2\/svg\/25aa.svg\" alt=\"\u25aa\ufe0f\" \/>From risk profile to management modes<\/strong><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Based on the three variables mentioned above, China examines EAOs\u2019 risk profiles in affecting stability and leverage value over Naypyidaw. Different configurations of assessments lead to different management modes, which are observable patterns of state behaviours (in this case, China), which fall short of being state policy or commitment. A chosen management mode defines how China deals with a particular EAO in a defined period, aimed at mitigating risk to China\u2019s interests without formal alliance or sponsorship. The following three management modes focus on what China does, not on how its policy is described.<\/p>\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Tolerant Containment<\/strong><br \/>In this management mode, China tolerates the existence of a particular EAO within a defined territory while constraining this EAO\u2019s behaviour. How China deals with the United Wa State Army (UWSA) is a good example of this mode. China does not publicly condemn or support the EAO; it allows for cross-border economic interaction, and intervenes only when the EAO\u2019s behaviour seems to cross a red line, such as threatening China\u2019s infrastructure project(s) in Myanmar or internationalising the Myanmar conflict.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"0cd56898-008a-4148-8586-bcdcef8b7e89\"><a id=\"0cd56898-008a-4148-8586-bcdcef8b7e89-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#0cd56898-008a-4148-8586-bcdcef8b7e89\">11<\/a><\/sup>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Tactical Accommodation<\/strong><br \/>Tactical accommodation occurs when China engages a particular EAO on an issue-specific matter to mitigate short-term risks rather than shape long-term political outcomes. China adopts this management mode in its engagements with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Arakan Army (ULA\/AA). Both these groups are still conducting military operations in areas where China\u2019s interests are located. The characteristics of this mode are crisis-driven mediation efforts, temporary talks, or public calls for de-escalation without political recognition or sustained support.\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Enablement Preceding Restraint<\/strong><br \/>Under this management mode, China allows military escalation by an EAO or several EAOs, when their moves can have some leverage value over Naypyidaw without China\u2019s direct involvement. China intervenes once an escalation seems to threaten its interests or empower the EAO(s) beyond its influence. Operation 1027 illustrates this mode best. China initially had a muted response; it adopted a non-intervention stance, and only shifted to assertive mediation, warning, and pressure to halt the operation when EAOs seemed to be enlarging their territorial reach and their alliances with emerging armed groups<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00a0<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These management modes are time-bound and conditional on the evolving conflict dynamics and on EAOs\u2019 risk profile changes. They capture the calculus of China\u2019s engagement with EAOs in the context of a constantly changing conflict.<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"emoji\" role=\"img\" draggable=\"false\" src=\"https:\/\/s.w.org\/images\/core\/emoji\/17.0.2\/svg\/25aa.svg\" alt=\"\u25aa\ufe0f\" \/>Comparative analysis of EAOs<\/strong><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Using this risk-based management framework to assess five EAOs in Myanmar\u2014UWSA, KIA, ULA\/AA, MNDAA and TNLA\u2014can assist comprehension of how China manages the different EAOs and how management modes may change over time.<\/p>\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>UWSA: Tolerant Containment<\/strong><br \/>UWSA is a typical example of the \u201ctolerant containment\u201d management mode. It is the most heavily armed actor, and is known to have solid military capacity. However, it has been avoiding direct military conflict with the Myanmar military since the 1989 ceasefire agreement.<br \/>\u00a0<br \/>For China, UWSA is a predictable actor who has been stable for decades and is not given to covert political signalling or international advocacy. Therefore, China tolerates it and allows cross-border economic interaction; sets a clear red line to preserve territorial stability and the safety of Chinese infrastructure; and restricts any action that could empower UWSA beyond China\u2019s influence. Two months after MNDAA, an ally of UWSA, seized Lashio in northern Shan State, China\u2019s Special Envoy for Asian Affairs held a meeting with UWSA leaders and warned them not to join the resistance and to cooperate instead in pressuring MNDAA. As a result, UWSA announced in August 2025 that it had halted all support for EAOs.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"d1270f1a-a698-4b6c-ab2a-c2c772408944\"><a id=\"d1270f1a-a698-4b6c-ab2a-c2c772408944-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#d1270f1a-a698-4b6c-ab2a-c2c772408944\">12<\/a><\/sup><br \/>\u00a0<br \/>The UWSA\u2019s military capacity also has leverage value over Naypyidaw. It affects Naypyidaw\u2019s strategic calculus without active conflict. For China, adopting \u201ctolerant containment\u201d on UWSA allows it to preserve stability and predictability without formal engagement.\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>KIA: Tactical Accommodation<\/strong><br \/>China\u2019s engagement with KIA is more conditional. Although KIA is still conducting military offensives in the Kachin and Sagaing regions, it has neither conducted nor participated in coordinated military operations with other EAOs since the 2021 military coup. It thus has moderate offensive capacity and cannot decisively alter the national power balance.<br \/>\u00a0<br \/>Since the 2021 coup, KIA has been assisting newly emerging armed groups such as the People Defence Forces, with training and weaponry, and local skirmishes. China initially did not oppose these moderate-intensity conflicts; after all, they did not threaten China\u2019s interests and could not destabilise Naypyidaw. However, this dynamic changed in 2024 after KIA seized Chipwi and Pengwa, the primary rare earth element (REE) extraction hubs, formerly controlled by the junta-aligned Kachin armed group, the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K).<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"c27600ea-abad-421d-ae34-ae025ff6a7ca\"><a id=\"c27600ea-abad-421d-ae34-ae025ff6a7ca-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#c27600ea-abad-421d-ae34-ae025ff6a7ca\">13<\/a><\/sup><br \/>\u00a0<br \/>Following that seizure, China shut down all border crossings adjacent to Kachin state and blocked the flow of essential commodities, resulting in a 200% surge in fuel prices in the state. China also cut down electricity to Pengwa to paralyse the KIA-controlled REE mining operations.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"9fc00124-1a2b-419f-82aa-bc6163e427fd\"><a id=\"9fc00124-1a2b-419f-82aa-bc6163e427fd-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#9fc00124-1a2b-419f-82aa-bc6163e427fd\">14<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0However, China shifted to more pragmatic engagements in December 2024, and a meeting with KIO officials in Kunming led to the reopening of the borders and the resumption of REE exports.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"91739483-60bb-4498-bd07-4f878872fc81\"><a id=\"91739483-60bb-4498-bd07-4f878872fc81-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#91739483-60bb-4498-bd07-4f878872fc81\">15<\/a><\/sup><br \/>\u00a0<br \/>Although China advocates a bilateral ceasefire between KIA and SAC, it does not apply its \u201cfive-cuts policy\u201d<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"b2aa65bd-3413-4478-88ac-2776c975dcf1\"><a id=\"b2aa65bd-3413-4478-88ac-2776c975dcf1-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#b2aa65bd-3413-4478-88ac-2776c975dcf1\">16<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0to KIA (The five cuts refer to cutting the supply of internet, fuel, electricity, food and essential commodities). To protect its strategic interests from KIA\u2019s control over REE mining sites, China monopolises the technology and energy infrastructure required for mining and refining.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"41e3c3e3-6e1d-4a49-8736-74c19291ee01\"><a id=\"41e3c3e3-6e1d-4a49-8736-74c19291ee01-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#41e3c3e3-6e1d-4a49-8736-74c19291ee01\">17<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0Additionally, to reduce its dependence on KIA-controlled REE mining sites, China accelerated exploration of new mining sites in southern Shan state with UWSA. This showed its unwillingness to view the KIA as a long-term strategic partner.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"4644bf58-f41f-416f-845d-4d9f95191b72\"><a id=\"4644bf58-f41f-416f-845d-4d9f95191b72-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#4644bf58-f41f-416f-845d-4d9f95191b72\">18<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0China has not accorded political recognition to KIO\/KIA nor tolerated long-term military operations near its border. Engagement is issue-specific, time-bound and reversible.\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>ULA\/AA: Tactical Accommodation<\/strong><br \/>China\u2019s engagement mode with ULA\/AA can be understood as \u201ctactical accommodation\u201d, resulting from the geographical distance of Rakhine state from the China border and ULA\/AA extending control over territories that host China\u2019s strategic economic assets in western Myanmar. ULA\/AA primarily operates in Rakhine State, which is not adjacent to Yunnan, and does not cause many direct spillover effects of conflicts into China. Nonetheless, this region hosts important strategic economic interests under the CMEC, such as an oil-and-gas pipeline linking Kyaukphyu in Rakhine with Kunming in Yunnan, and a proposed deep-sea port. Initially, during Operation 1027, China did not publicly oppose or endorse AA\u2019s territorial expansion in Rakhine State; nor did it recognise the ULA\/AA as a legitimate authority.<br \/>\u00a0<br \/>However, China started to engage with AA\u2019s officials after AA gained full control of two wind power projects in Thandwe and Ann, and partially controlled the other eight Chinese projects, including the deep-sea port in Kyaukphyu.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"5252dbed-a790-4c0b-afc0-bbf455f94657\"><a id=\"5252dbed-a790-4c0b-afc0-bbf455f94657-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#5252dbed-a790-4c0b-afc0-bbf455f94657\">19<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0Chinese officials hosted a meeting with AA\u2019s officials in Tengchong, Yunnan in December 2024.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"d1d3b5cd-c4ec-48b5-bf3a-8bf1beae058a\"><a id=\"d1d3b5cd-c4ec-48b5-bf3a-8bf1beae058a-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#d1d3b5cd-c4ec-48b5-bf3a-8bf1beae058a\">20<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0Following that meeting, AA publicly announced in August 2025 that it welcomes foreign investment and pays special attention to the security and safety of individuals involved in such investments.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"7714702a-41e7-4be3-8eba-bedf30ba7484\"><a id=\"7714702a-41e7-4be3-8eba-bedf30ba7484-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#7714702a-41e7-4be3-8eba-bedf30ba7484\">21<\/a><\/sup><br \/>\u00a0<br \/>China has also refrained from using its \u201cfive-cuts\u201d tactics on ULA\/AA. This was primarily for two reasons. First, as mentioned above, although AA possesses relatively powerful military capacity, the geographical distance of Rakhine state from the China-Myanmar border makes it more difficult for China to conduct \u201cfive-cuts\u201d tactics the way it did on TNLA and MNDAA. Second, ULA\/AA signals itself as a predictable and reliable actor in protecting Chinese strategic interests. ULA\/AA publicly announced for the first time in March 2024 that it welcomes foreign investment and prioritises security and safety before its partial control of the deep-sea port.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"b5222707-fe95-460b-bf5d-c12e907f6b50\"><a id=\"b5222707-fe95-460b-bf5d-c12e907f6b50-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#b5222707-fe95-460b-bf5d-c12e907f6b50\">22<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0It made a second such announcement in August 2025. Besides, it has not rushed to gain complete control over Kyaukphyu despite besieging the town for months.<br \/>\u00a0<br \/>Overall, China\u2019s engagement with ULA\/AA is issue-specific, conditional, and risk-mitigating, and has the expressed objective of risk containment rather than rollback of AA\u2019s military objectives. This pattern reflects the \u201ctactical accommodation\u201d management mode, aimed at safeguarding strategic assets and preventing escalation without political recognition or long-term partnership.\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>MNDAA: Enablement preceding Restraint<\/strong><br \/>China\u2019s management of MNDAA reflects the \u201cenablement preceding restraint\u201d mode. MNDAA\u2019s offensive capacity was useful to China as an instrument to coerce Naypyidaw; however, China constrained MNDAA\u2019s military operations once it assessed that MNDAA had crossed the red line.<br \/>\u00a0<br \/>Before Operation 1027, China was frustrated with the SAC\u2019s non-compliance with China\u2019s request to eradicate online scam operations in the Kokang region adjacent to the China border, then controlled by the SAC-aligned Border Guard Force led by Bai Saocheng. Despite China\u2019s urging, neither SAC nor Bai\u2019s forces took any action to dismantle the scam operations. The situation worsened in October 2023 with the reported murder of 60 Chinese nationals, including undercover police officers, in Bai\u2019s territory.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"44c6a36b-2a81-4689-884e-a788077acad0\"><a id=\"44c6a36b-2a81-4689-884e-a788077acad0-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#44c6a36b-2a81-4689-884e-a788077acad0\">23<\/a><\/sup><br \/>\u00a0<br \/>That same month, the Three Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027, framed with dual objectives of controlling territories and eradicating scam operations along the China-Myanmar border. Rather than opposing this move, which had led to unprecedented military losses and the annihilation of Bai\u2019s force, China perceived it as a punishment of Naypyidaw for non-compliance. Only after the crackdown on scam centres along the border did China mediate and host talks between the Brotherhood Alliance and SAC. This led to a ceasefire agreement being signed in Heigang, China, in January 2024.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"1a7004a0-3c41-4434-8a6b-7bdcf3ab3f1a\"><a id=\"1a7004a0-3c41-4434-8a6b-7bdcf3ab3f1a-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#1a7004a0-3c41-4434-8a6b-7bdcf3ab3f1a\">24<\/a><\/sup><br \/>\u00a0<br \/>However, the Three Brotherhood Alliance and other newly-emerged armed groups launched a second coordinated offensive in July 2024, named \u201cOperation 1027 second wave,\u201d taking a large swath of territories, including Lashio.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"5d3b3986-ef85-4b4c-9f40-ac5d91965e2a\"><a id=\"5d3b3986-ef85-4b4c-9f40-ac5d91965e2a-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#5d3b3986-ef85-4b4c-9f40-ac5d91965e2a\">25<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0Fulfilling its objective of having the scam centres along the border dismantled, and recognising the lack of centrality to replace Naypyidaw if it fell, China shifted its approach. It backed SAC by restoring diplomatic engagement and putting pressure on TNLA and MNDAA, which had been tolerated in the first wave.<br \/>\u00a0<br \/>China shut down the border crossings and blocked the flow of essential goods in northern Shan State while retaining MNDAA leaders in Yunnan. Besides, China also warned UWSA, a closed ally of MNDAA and TNLA, not to join and support the resistance. Consequently, MNDAA had to halt its offensive and agree to a bilateral ceasefire with SAC, thus relinquishing Lashio. Moreover, it had to cut ties with newly emerging armed groups within the Spring Revolution movements and the international media.<br \/>\u00a0<br \/>Overall, China initially tolerated the coordinated military operation to punish the SAC for non-compliance, while restraining MNDAA through the five-cuts tactics, from being powerful enough to overcome China\u2019s influence through new alliances and relations with international media. This \u201cenablement preceding restraint\u201d management mode underscores China\u2019s conditional tolerance, which can be withdrawn once leverage value turns into liability.\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>TNLA: Enablement preceding Restraint<\/strong><br \/>Regarding engagement with China, TNLA also faced the same trajectory as MNDAA; both groups operate primarily in northern Shan, adjacent to the China-Myanmar border, and are part of the alliance that launched Operation 1027. But there are some nuanced differences between the two cases.<br \/>\u00a0<br \/>MNDAA swiftly halted its offensive and relinquished Lashio in January 2025 once China exerted assertive mediation. TNLA, however, decided to continue the offensive and maintain ties with armed groups of the Spring Revolution movement.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"4685f8dd-657d-4ad6-8a85-c96b1c6eccae\"><a id=\"4685f8dd-657d-4ad6-8a85-c96b1c6eccae-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#4685f8dd-657d-4ad6-8a85-c96b1c6eccae\">26<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0Although China facilitated talks between TNLA and SAC in February<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"792ec8a7-c449-4b52-ac71-f42ef131f301\"><a id=\"792ec8a7-c449-4b52-ac71-f42ef131f301-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#792ec8a7-c449-4b52-ac71-f42ef131f301\">27<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0and April 2025, no substantive results emerged.<sup class=\"fn\" data-fn=\"10bd72b7-4a11-4e32-95e1-71f7e8516048\"><a id=\"10bd72b7-4a11-4e32-95e1-71f7e8516048-link\" href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#10bd72b7-4a11-4e32-95e1-71f7e8516048\">28<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0The SAC, this time backed by China and having already agreed to a ceasefire with MNDAA, started a counteroffensive in TNLA-controlled territories, and seized Nawnghkio in July 2025 and Kyaukme in October 2025. Meanwhile, China also escalated its \u201cfive-cuts policy\u201d on TNLA. To ensure its survival, TNLA finally agreed to a bilateral ceasefire with SAC in October, resulting in the relinquishment of Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Mogok and Momeik.<br \/>\u00a0<br \/>TNLA\u2019s initial attempts to continue the offensive and maintain ties with the Spring Revolution movement despite China\u2019s mediation would have been interpreted as TNLA unreliability by China. Consequently, when MNDAA attacked and seized a TNLA-controlled township, Kutkai, located on the Mandalay-Muse border trade road with China in March 2026, China remained silent despite its claim to be maintaining border stability.\u00a0<br \/>\u00a0<br \/>Although China initially tolerated a coordinated military operation along the border and utilised it as a tool to pressure Naypyidaw, it later mediated (and compelled) EAOs towards bilateral ceasefires. When TNLA showed some reluctance, China did not hesitate to assert its five-cuts policy but remained silent when MNDAA attacked TNLA. China\u2019s engagement with TNLA seems issue-specific and reversible based on the actors\u2019 risk profiles, and underscores the sequence of enablement followed by restraints once leverage values turn into liability.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"emoji\" role=\"img\" draggable=\"false\" src=\"https:\/\/s.w.org\/images\/core\/emoji\/17.0.2\/svg\/25aa.svg\" alt=\"\u25aa\ufe0f\" \/>CONCLUSION<\/strong><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">China\u2019s differentiated management modes with EAOs have an important effect on Myanmar\u2019s conflict dynamics. An armed group that misinterprets China\u2019s tolerance as support and chooses escalation risks faces coercive tactics from China. This is because China does not view EAOs in Myanmar as long-term strategic partners, but rather, as instrumental tools with which 1) to punish Naypyidaw when and as it deems necessary and 2) to safeguard its strategic interests when Naypyidaw\u2019s ability to do so shrinks.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Even so, China still needs to maintain strong ties with EAOs, and to safeguard its strategic assets in Myanmar. China is aware that these EAOs could gain more territorial and administrative control through military victories, especially alongside new\/emerging armed actors, or forge relations with external actors beyond China and thus break free of China\u2019s influence. To prevent this, China constantly monitors Myanmar\u2019s conflict dynamics and does not hesitate to exert coercive and assertive tactics if and when an EAO risk-profile exceeds thresholds. The EAOs are also aware that crossing China\u2019s red line could threaten their overall survival. They thus consistently and cautiously seek to align their strategic interest with China\u2019s, and to expand their military and political power while avoiding China\u2019s redlines.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">China\u2019s approach to EAOs cannot be interpreted as support or opposition, but as a form of risk-based management. By assessing EAOs\u2019 risk profiles based on geographic proximity, leverage potential on Naypyidaw, and independence, China chooses a conditional and reversible calibrated management mode to mitigate risks to itself.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This framework may assist in comprehending the apparent inconsistencies in China\u2019s approach, and in providing an alternative lens for analysing China\u2019s role in the Myanmar conflict. The constantly changing on-ground dynamics in Myanmar shape the EAOs\u2019 risk profiles, thereby shifting the nature of China\u2019s approach in line with the underlying logic of its risk-based management framework.<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"emoji\" role=\"img\" draggable=\"false\" src=\"https:\/\/s.w.org\/images\/core\/emoji\/17.0.2\/svg\/25aa.svg\" alt=\"\u25aa\ufe0f\" \/>Footnot<\/strong>es<\/p>\n<ol class=\"wp-block-footnotes has-small-font-size\">\n<li id=\"08486185-fc3e-4f14-8ea4-5fe105ef79c2\">This was a significant offensive military operation initiated and led by three EAOs, known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance (or 3BHA), in Myanmar\u2019s northern Shan State. The Myanmar military lost two Regional Command Centers and hundreds of military bases during this operation. The 3BHA stated Operation 1027\u2019s objectives as: autonomy, deterring bombardments by the Myanmar military, combating online gambling, and \u201ceradicating the oppressive military dictatorship\u201d. This offensive moved rapidly along most parts of the SinoMyanmar trade route before China stepped in to mediate a ceasefire. See Wai Moe, \u201cThe Myanmar Junta\u2019s Unhappy New Year\u201d, 24 January 2024, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/fulcrum.sg\/the-myanmar-juntas-unhappy-new-year\/\">https:\/\/fulcrum.sg\/the-myanmar-juntas-unhappy-new-year\/\u00a0<\/a>; and Wai Moe, \u201cMyanmar Military Losing Control: A Culmination of Past Policy Errors?\u201d, 17 November 2023\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/fulcrum.sg\/myanmar-military-losing-control-a-culmination-of-past-policy-errors\/\">https:\/\/fulcrum.sg\/myanmar-military-losing-control-a-culmination-of-past-policy-errors\/<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#08486185-fc3e-4f14-8ea4-5fe105ef79c2-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 1\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"1382fa6d-ca4f-4637-8af1-1592e9edb71b\">Burma News International (Myanmar Peace Monitor), \u201cOperation 1027 and the Direction of the Spring Revolution,\u201d May 3, 2024.\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/mmpeacemonitor.org\/en\/analysis-paper-en\/operation-1027-and-the-direction-of-the-springrevolution\/?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">https:\/\/mmpeacemonitor.org\/en\/analysis-paper-en\/operation-1027-and-the-direction-of-the-springrevolution\/?utm_source=chatgpt.com<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#1382fa6d-ca4f-4637-8af1-1592e9edb71b-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 2\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"5a320b82-abc0-4ed0-a72c-867887c36f78\">The Irrawaddy, \u201cMNDAA Claims Seizure of Myanmar Junta Command Headquarters\u201d, 3 August 2024\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.irrawaddy.com\/news\/war-against-the-junta\/mndaa-claims-seizure-of-myanmar-junta-commandheadquarters.html\">https:\/\/www.irrawaddy.com\/news\/war-against-the-junta\/mndaa-claims-seizure-of-myanmar-junta-commandheadquarters.html<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#5a320b82-abc0-4ed0-a72c-867887c36f78-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 3\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"6d122d68-375b-453f-b906-48ea8ac5819a\">Offlicial name of military government then.\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#6d122d68-375b-453f-b906-48ea8ac5819a-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 4\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"dc33ce61-a321-4e9c-ab7e-f33babba13cb\">BBC News Burmese. \u201c\u1010\u101b\u102f\u1010\u103a\u1006\u102f\u1036\u1038\u1016\u103c\u1010\u103a\u1010\u1032\u1037 \u101c\u102c\u1038\u101b\u103e\u102d\u102f\u1038\u1021\u102f\u1015\u103a\u1001\u103b\u102f\u1015\u103a\u101e\u1030 \u1021\u1015\u103c\u1031\u102c\u1004\u103a\u1038\u1021\u101c\u1032 \u201d BBC News Burmese. November 10, 2025.<br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/burmese\/articles\/cm24xd97y3ko.\">https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/burmese\/articles\/cm24xd97y3ko.<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#dc33ce61-a321-4e9c-ab7e-f33babba13cb-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 5\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"36531a6f-e063-4617-961f-71a406a3cea6\">Myanmar Now, \u201c\u1010\u101b\u102f\u1010\u103a\u1000\u103c\u102c\u1038\u101d\u1004\u103a\u1019\u103e\u102f\u1016\u103c\u1004\u1037\u103a TNLA \u1014\u103e\u1004\u1037\u103a \u1005\u1005\u103a\u1000\u1031\u102c\u103a\u1019\u101b\u103e\u1004\u103a \u1021\u1015\u1005\u103a\u101b\u1015\u103a\u1015\u103c\u102e\u201d Myanmar Now, October 27, 2025,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/myanmar-now.org\/mm\/news\/68864\/\">https:\/\/myanmar-now.org\/mm\/news\/68864\/<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#36531a6f-e063-4617-961f-71a406a3cea6-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 6\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"e1e4a982-3f92-4598-861f-8112e66c57f1\">Myo Naing and Yizheng Zou, Operation 1027: A Turning Point in Myanmar\u2019s Conflict Landscape (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2026),\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-981-95-5005-0\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-981-95-5005-0<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#e1e4a982-3f92-4598-861f-8112e66c57f1-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 7\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"ab05b8d7-531e-481f-a540-a58bd8cffd68\">Development Media Group (DMG), \u201c\u1010\u102d\u102f\u1000\u103a\u1015\u103d\u1032\u1015\u103c\u1004\u103a\u1038\u1011\u1014\u103a\u101c\u102c\u104d \u1000\u103b\u1031\u102c\u1000\u103a\u1016\u103c\u1030\u1005\u102e\u1019\u1036\u1000\u102d\u1014\u103a\u1038\u1019\u103b\u102c\u1038\u1000\u102d\u102f \u1000\u102c\u1000\u103d\u101a\u103a\u101b\u1014\u103a \u1010\u101b\u102f\u1010\u103a\u101c\u102f\u1036\u1001\u103c\u102f\u1036\u101b\u1031\u1038\u1010\u1015\u103a \u101b\u102c\u1001\u103b\u102e \u1001\u103b\u1011\u102c\u1038\u201d DMG, January 13, 2026,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.dmgburmese.com\/%E1%80%9E%E1%80%90%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8\/tkskc.ht%20ml\">https:\/\/www.dmgburmese.com\/%E1%80%9E%E1%80%90%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8\/tkskc.ht ml<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#ab05b8d7-531e-481f-a540-a58bd8cffd68-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 8\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"b575e466-3541-4c44-8672-9b2dd22051da\">BBC News Burmese, \u201c\u1041\u1040\u1042\u1047 \u1005\u1005\u103a\u1006\u1004\u103a\u101b\u1031\u1038 \u1018\u101a\u103a\u1021\u1011\u102d \u101b\u1031\u102c\u1000\u103a\u101c\u102c\u1019\u101c\u1032 \u201d BBC News \u1019\u103c\u1014\u103a\u1019\u102c, October 31, 2023,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/burmese\/articles\/cz979ydpdpno\">https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/burmese\/articles\/cz979ydpdpno<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#b575e466-3541-4c44-8672-9b2dd22051da-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 9\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"0052f293-5735-4d5d-936d-eae2915ced14\">CNI, \u201cMNDAA Prohibits Its Members of Party, Troops Not to Deal with ASEAN, US and Western Group,\u201d CNI News, October 14, 2024,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/cnimyanmar.com\/index.php\/english-edition\/25099-mndaa-prohibits-itsmembers-of-party-troops-not-to-deal-with-asean-us-and-western-group\">https:\/\/cnimyanmar.com\/index.php\/english-edition\/25099-mndaa-prohibits-itsmembers-of-party-troops-not-to-deal-with-asean-us-and-western-group<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#0052f293-5735-4d5d-936d-eae2915ced14-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 10\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"0cd56898-008a-4148-8586-bcdcef8b7e89\">Eleven Media, \u201cLeak Reveals Secret Meeting between China\u2019s Envoy, Wa Group on Controlling MNDAA,\u201d Asia News Network, October 8, 2024,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/asianews.network\/leak-reveals-secret-meeting-between-chinasenvoy-wa-group-on-controlling-mndaa\/\">https:\/\/asianews.network\/leak-reveals-secret-meeting-between-chinasenvoy-wa-group-on-controlling-mndaa\/<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#0cd56898-008a-4148-8586-bcdcef8b7e89-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 11\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"d1270f1a-a698-4b6c-ab2a-c2c772408944\">Radio Free Asia (RFA) Burmese, \u201c\u1005\u1005\u103a\u1010\u1015\u103a\u1015\u103c\u102d\u102f\u101c\u1032\u1019\u103e\u102c \u1019\u101c\u102d\u102f\u101c\u102c\u1038\u1000\u103c\u1031\u102c\u1004\u103a\u1038 \u1010\u101b\u102f\u1010\u103a\u1021\u1011\u1030\u1038\u1000\u102d\u102f\u101a\u103a\u1005\u102c\u1038\u101c\u103e\u101a\u103a\u1015\u103c\u1031\u102c\u1010\u101a\u103a\u1006\u102d\u102f\u1010\u1032\u1037 \u1021\u1005\u100a\u103a\u1038\u1021\u101d\u1031\u1038\u1019\u103e\u1010\u103a\u1010\u1019\u103a\u1038 \u1015\u1031\u102b\u1000\u103a\u1000\u103c\u102c\u1038,\u201d RFA Burmese, October 5, 2024,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rfa.org\/burmese\/news\/china-uwsa-myanmar-military-10052024145809.html\">https:\/\/www.rfa.org\/burmese\/news\/china-uwsa-myanmar-military-10052024145809.html<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#d1270f1a-a698-4b6c-ab2a-c2c772408944-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 12\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"c27600ea-abad-421d-ae34-ae025ff6a7ca\">\u1019\u1004\u103a\u1038\u101e\u1005\u103a, \u201c \u1019\u103c\u1031\u101b\u103e\u102c\u1038 \u2013 \u1012\u1031\u102b\u103a\u101c\u102c\u1018\u102e\u101c\u103b\u1036\u1001\u103b\u102e\u1010\u1014\u103a\u1010\u1032\u1037 \u1014\u101a\u103a\u1019\u103c\u1031\u101e\u102d\u1019\u103a\u1038\u1015\u102d\u102f\u1000\u103a\u1019\u103e\u102f \u201d BBC News \u1019\u103c\u1014\u103a\u1019\u102c, November 7, 2024,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/burmese\/articles\/cwyxj7vg9dqo.\">https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/burmese\/articles\/cwyxj7vg9dqo.<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#c27600ea-abad-421d-ae34-ae025ff6a7ca-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 13\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"9fc00124-1a2b-419f-82aa-bc6163e427fd\">Mizzima. \u201cAll Rare Earth Mining in Pang War Stopped after China Cuts Electricity in Myanmar Town.\u201d Mizzima. October 26, 2024.\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/eng.mizzima.com\/2024\/10\/26\/15530.\">https:\/\/eng.mizzima.com\/2024\/10\/26\/15530.<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#9fc00124-1a2b-419f-82aa-bc6163e427fd-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 14\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"91739483-60bb-4498-bd07-4f878872fc81\">Myanmar Now, \u201c\u1000\u1001\u103b\u1004\u103a\u1015\u103c\u100a\u103a\u1014\u101a\u103a\u1021\u1010\u103d\u1004\u103a\u1038\u101b\u103e\u102d \u1014\u101a\u103a\u1005\u1015\u103a\u1002\u102d\u1010\u103a\u1019\u103b\u102c\u1038\u1000\u102d\u102f \u1010\u101b\u102f\u1010\u103a\u1021\u1005\u102d\u102f\u1038\u101b \u1015\u103c\u1014\u103a\u1016\u103d\u1004\u1037\u103a\u1015\u1031\u1038 \u201d October 27, 2025, Myanmar Now,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/web.facebook.com\/myanmarnownews\/posts\/1229811089181634\/\">https:\/\/web.facebook.com\/myanmarnownews\/posts\/1229811089181634\/<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#91739483-60bb-4498-bd07-4f878872fc81-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 15\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"b2aa65bd-3413-4478-88ac-2776c975dcf1\">China practices a five-cuts policy in Myanmar border areas with China as part of its influence or coercion tactics towards EAOs in those areas. See Jared Bissinger, \u201cHow China Outmanoeuvres the West in Myanmar\u201d, 26 November 2025, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/fulcrum.sg\/how-china-outmanoeuvres-the-west-in-myanmar\/\">https:\/\/fulcrum.sg\/how-china-outmanoeuvres-the-west-in-myanmar\/<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#b2aa65bd-3413-4478-88ac-2776c975dcf1-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 16\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"41e3c3e3-6e1d-4a49-8736-74c19291ee01\">Amara Thiha. \u201c\u201cRare Earths and Realpolitik: The Future of Mediation in Myanmar.\u201d Stimson Center. June 12, 2025.\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.stimson.org\/2025\/rare-earths-and-realpolitik-future-of-mediation-myanmar\/\">https:\/\/www.stimson.org\/2025\/rare-earths-and-realpolitik-future-of-mediation-myanmar\/<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#41e3c3e3-6e1d-4a49-8736-74c19291ee01-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 17\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"4644bf58-f41f-416f-845d-4d9f95191b72\">Yumlembam, Ophelia. \u201cChina\u2019s Dominance in Myanmar\u2019s Rare Earth Resources: A Growing Risk for Global Supply Chains.\u201d 9DASHLINE, August 22, 2025.\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.9dashline.com\/article\/chinas-dominance-inmyanmars-rare-earth-resources-a-growing-risk-for-global-supply-chains.\">https:\/\/www.9dashline.com\/article\/chinas-dominance-inmyanmars-rare-earth-resources-a-growing-risk-for-global-supply-chains.<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#4644bf58-f41f-416f-845d-4d9f95191b72-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 18\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"5252dbed-a790-4c0b-afc0-bbf455f94657\">Institute for Strategy and Policy \u2013 Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar), \u201c10 Chinese Projects in Rakhine State Under AA\u2019s Control,\u201d ISP-Myanmar, December 24, 2024,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/mp-75\/\">https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/mp-75\/<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#5252dbed-a790-4c0b-afc0-bbf455f94657-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 19\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"d1d3b5cd-c4ec-48b5-bf3a-8bf1beae058a\">Development Media Group (DMG). \u201c\u1010\u101b\u102f\u1010\u103a\u1014\u1032\u1037 AA \u1006\u103d\u1031\u1038\u1014\u103d\u1031\u1038\u1019\u103e\u102f \u1018\u101a\u103a\u101c\u102d\u102f\u101b\u101c\u1012\u103a\u1010\u103d\u1031 \u1011\u103d\u1000\u103a\u1015\u1031\u102b\u103a\u101c\u102c\u1014\u102d\u102f\u1004\u103a\u101e\u101c\u1032\u201d DMG. December 16, 2024.\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.dmgburmese.com\/%E1%80%9E%E1%80%90%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8\/taroalad.%20html\">https:\/\/www.dmgburmese.com\/%E1%80%9E%E1%80%90%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8\/taroalad. html<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#d1d3b5cd-c4ec-48b5-bf3a-8bf1beae058a-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 20\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"7714702a-41e7-4be3-8eba-bedf30ba7484\">Development Media Group (DMG), \u201c\u1010\u101b\u102f\u1010\u103a\u1005\u102e\u1019\u1036\u1000\u102d\u1014\u103a\u1038 \u1041\u1041 \u1001\u102f\u1021\u1014\u1000\u103a \u1049 \u1001\u102f\u1000\u102d\u102f AA \u1010\u1005\u102d\u1010\u103a\u1010\u1015\u102d\u102f\u1004\u103a\u1038\u1011\u102d\u1014\u103a\u1038\u1001\u103b\u102f\u1015\u103a\u201d DMG, August 24, 2024,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.dmgburmese.com\/%E1%80%9E%E1%80%90%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8\/ispaachi%20na.html\">https:\/\/www.dmgburmese.com\/%E1%80%9E%E1%80%90%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8\/ispaachi na.html<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#7714702a-41e7-4be3-8eba-bedf30ba7484-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 21\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"b5222707-fe95-460b-bf5d-c12e907f6b50\">Global Arakan Network, \u201cArakan Army Vows to Protect the Foreign Investments in Arakan,\u201d Global Arakan Network, March 26, 2024,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.globalarakannetwork.com\/post\/arakan-army-vows-to-protect-theforeign-investments-in-arakan\">https:\/\/www.globalarakannetwork.com\/post\/arakan-army-vows-to-protect-theforeign-investments-in-arakan<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#b5222707-fe95-460b-bf5d-c12e907f6b50-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 22\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"44c6a36b-2a81-4689-884e-a788077acad0\">\u201cCrouching Tiger, Fearsome Dragon: China\u2019s Expanding Role in Combating Crime in Myanmar,\u201d Asia Crime Century (Substack), October 2024,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/asiacrimecentury.substack.com\/p\/crouching-tiger-fearsomedragon-china\">https:\/\/asiacrimecentury.substack.com\/p\/crouching-tiger-fearsomedragon-china<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#44c6a36b-2a81-4689-884e-a788077acad0-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 23\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"1a7004a0-3c41-4434-8a6b-7bdcf3ab3f1a\">\u201cMyanmar\u2019s Military, Ethnic Armed Groups Agree to China-Mediated Truce,\u201d Al Jazeera, January 12, 2024,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2024\/1\/12\/myanmars-military-ethnic-armed-groups-agree-to-china-mediatedtruce\">https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2024\/1\/12\/myanmars-military-ethnic-armed-groups-agree-to-china-mediatedtruce<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#1a7004a0-3c41-4434-8a6b-7bdcf3ab3f1a-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 24\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"5d3b3986-ef85-4b4c-9f40-ac5d91965e2a\">Myanmar Now, \u201c\u101c\u102c\u1038\u101b\u103e\u102d\u102f\u1038\u1010\u102d\u102f\u1004\u103a\u1038\u1005\u1005\u103a\u100c\u102c\u1014\u1001\u103b\u102f\u1015\u103a\u1000\u102d\u102f MNDAA \u101e\u102d\u1019\u103a\u1038\u1015\u103c\u102e\u1038\u1014\u1031\u102c\u1000\u103a \u1015\u103c\u1004\u103a\u1038\u1011\u1014\u103a\u101e\u100a\u1037\u103a\u1010\u102d\u102f\u1000\u103a\u1015\u103d\u1032\u1019\u103b\u102c\u1038 \u1006\u1000\u103a\u1016\u103c\u1005\u103a,\u201d Myanmar Now, July 25, 2024,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/myanmar-now.org\/mm\/news\/55386\/\">https:\/\/myanmar-now.org\/mm\/news\/55386\/<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#5d3b3986-ef85-4b4c-9f40-ac5d91965e2a-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 25\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"4685f8dd-657d-4ad6-8a85-c96b1c6eccae\">Naing Min Lwin, \u201c\u1010\u101b\u102f\u1010\u103a \u1016\u102d\u1021\u102c\u1038\u1000\u103c\u102c\u1038\u1000 TNLA \u104f \u1001\u1036\u1014\u102d\u102f\u1004\u103a\u1005\u103d\u1019\u103a\u1038\u1014\u103e\u1004\u1037\u103a \u101b\u103e\u1031\u1037\u1006\u1000\u103a\u101b\u1019\u100a\u1037\u103a\u101c\u1019\u103a\u1038\u201d, Ayeyarwaddy Times, May 10, 2025,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/web.facebook.com\/photo.php?fbid=1014669954135357&amp;set=a.583120797290277&amp;id=10006777086249%208&amp;_rdc=1&amp;_rdr#\">https:\/\/web.facebook.com\/photo.php?fbid=1014669954135357&amp;set=a.583120797290277&amp;id=10006777086249 8&amp;_rdc=1&amp;_rdr#<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#4685f8dd-657d-4ad6-8a85-c96b1c6eccae-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 26\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"792ec8a7-c449-4b52-ac71-f42ef131f301\">BBC News Burmese, \u201c\u1021\u1016\u103c\u1031\u1019\u1011\u103d\u1000\u103a\u1001\u1032\u1037\u1010\u1032\u1037 TNLA \u1014\u1032\u1037 \u1005\u1005\u103a\u1010\u1015\u103a \u1006\u103d\u1031\u1038\u1014\u103d\u1031\u1038\u1015\u103d\u1032\u201d BBC News \u1019\u103c\u1014\u103a\u1019\u102c, February 19, 2025,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/burmese\/articles\/cx2xnl901m9o\">https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/burmese\/articles\/cx2xnl901m9o<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#792ec8a7-c449-4b52-ac71-f42ef131f301-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 27\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"10bd72b7-4a11-4e32-95e1-71f7e8516048\">Radio Free Asia (RFA), \u201cMyanmar Ta\u2019ang Army Expands Territory Despite Chinese Pressure,\u201d Radio Free Asia, May 5, 2025.\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rfa.org\/english\/myanmar\/2025\/05\/05\/myanmar-taang-army-territory-chinesepressure\/\">https:\/\/www.rfa.org\/english\/myanmar\/2025\/05\/05\/myanmar-taang-army-territory-chinesepressure\/<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ispmyanmar.com\/managing-the-margins-chinas-risk-calculus-in-myanmars-civil-war\/#10bd72b7-4a11-4e32-95e1-71f7e8516048-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 28\">\u21a9<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This paper attempts an explanation using a risk-management assessment approach. It posits that China engages with EAOs in Myanmar based on risk management, which is actor-specific, time-bound and reversible since its primary goals are border stability and safeguarding its strategic and economic interests in Myanmar. By Htet Shein Lynn This photo taken on 21 May [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":3040,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4,3,17,12],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3039","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-articles","category-news","category-opinioncommentary","category-recent-news"],"post_mailing_queue_ids":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/arakanwatch.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3039","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/arakanwatch.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/arakanwatch.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arakanwatch.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arakanwatch.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3039"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/arakanwatch.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3039\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3041,"href":"https:\/\/arakanwatch.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3039\/revisions\/3041"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arakanwatch.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3040"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/arakanwatch.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3039"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arakanwatch.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3039"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arakanwatch.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3039"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}